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Sir Jeremy Greenstock
The world has changed, but how? Those who sat at the top table of the previous era are finding it hardest to readjust to the new geopolitical environment, because they have 
the most to lose and they are psychologically resistant to adaptation. It is especially difficult 
for those countries whose power and influence, stemming from the technological and 
organisational advantages of the West in the 19th and 20th centuries, was disproportionate to 
their population size. The world of the new millennium is returning to a more natural order 
of population size and resource availability, because economic opportunity is more evenly 
distributed by globalised communications, trade and the spread of freedom. It is economic 
capability that has become the primary criterion of global weight nowadays.
The United Kingdom, with 60 million people and few material resources relevant to modern life, has 
to assess its place in this new mix with especial care. After World War Two, with the momentum of 
Britain’s industrial leadership exhausted, we could have sunk rapidly into second-class obscurity. For 
thirty years after 1945 it felt as if we were doing just that. But three things in particular gave the 
UK a second wind in the international arena: our experience as a trading nation in an increasingly 
open world; our usefulness to the United States in matters of defence and security, which gave 
Americans the feeling that its relationship with the UK was of special value; and the depth, breadth 
and organisational strengths of our government machinery, compared with others. The unimpressive 
performance of the British economy, not least its manufacturing sector, was a limiting factor, setting 
constraints on the modernisation of our instruments of power. But a partial recovery from the 1980s 
onwards, built increasingly on open market policies and the dynamism of the services sector, saw the 
country competing creditably for fourth place in the world’s economic tables and capable of sustaining 
its defence forces and overseas representation at a level above most of its competitors.
Britain’s role and performance at the United Nations is an interesting prism through which to illuminate 
the country’s strengths and weaknesses in the international arena. The status of Permanent Membership 
of the Security Council, a product of the aftermath of World War Two, could never be achieved for the 
UK on the basis of its 21st century assets. Our future is seen from outside, if not domestically, as linked 
to the impact of the European Union, which in the political, security and diplomatic fields makes a less 
weighty impression globally than the apparent sum of its parts. Even the advent of the EU’s External 
Action Service under the new High Representative, Catherine Ashton, will not change the capacity to 
deliver power and influence as a collective, until and unless the EU comes much closer to forming a 
genuine political union of purpose and political decision-making. That is a receding prospect.
Meanwhile, the UK does not perform badly at dealing with the world as it is. Conscious of our modest 
qualifications for the premier league, we earn our Security Council place on a continuing basis by the 
contribution we make to problem-solving and to sensible development policies across the whole range 
of UN activities. We have to be careful not to flaunt status in any way and to indicate that the work of 
the Security Council is in truth a subset of the UN’s whole approach to development. All Permanent 
Members of the Security Council take generic stick, but in other respects it is surprising that the UK 
receives so little direct criticism for its Permanent Membership. The fact is that our competence at 
multilateral diplomacy and our capacity for constructing routes out of complex problems earn us 
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enough respect to get by. Similar considerations apply 
in Brussels, where our EU partners grow exasperated 
with our lack of enthusiasm for the grand project 
but prefer to have us contributing our pragmatism. 
Iraq dealt a heavy blow to this image of a gently fading 
but still useful UK. At the UN, but also on occasions 
in other international forums, even including NATO, 
the British had been able to gain credit, in spite 
of appearances, for softening, interpreting, re-
channelling or sometimes even resisting the rougher 
or more alarming initiatives of the United States. The 
wider membership of the UN know that they have 
to live with the superpower and like to avoid direct 
confrontation with it, but the majority are highly 
critical of the US’s inclination to do its own thing with 
scant regard for other countries’ viewpoints. The UK 
could often find ways of finessing such difficulties and 
thereby earn some forgiveness for their pro-American 
tendencies. Iraq exploded that trade-off. We were 
seen as trying but failing to gather legitimacy for the 
March 2003 invasion and as putting our alliance with 
the US above our support for the international order. 
For a while the issue also turned EU exasperation 
into something close to hostility. The saga will not 
be forgotten in the international sparring-grounds 
for a generation and has made it harder to sustain 
our problem-solver image.
Against this background, the recent financial crisis 
has come at a bad time. With China, India, Brazil and 
others flexing their muscles with more confidence on 
the international stage, the UK was anyway going 
to start sliding down the relative power scale. To 
have been complicit in allowing the global financial 
sector, where the City of London has genuinely played 
in the first league, to overreach itself and crash is 
a significant bullet in the foot. The Anglo-Saxon 
financial model has taken a pasting; and, worse, we 
have landed ourselves with a volume of debt which 
has, as the recent budget cuts confirm, made it even 
harder to sustain the minimum levels of armed forces, 
diplomatic missions and development aid projects to 
support a claim to be a substantive independent actor 
in the global arena. In these circumstances it is more 
important than ever that we maintain the country’s 
capacity to live with the larger powers, to persuade 
other actors that the collective way is the best, to 
manage our schizophrenic approach to the EU and 
to make the most of the new opportunities in the 
G20. Amongst other things, this means having the 
sharpest diplomats around. It also means investing 
in representative capacity rather than subjecting 
the Diplomatic Service to an ongoing series of 
financial cuts. The current budget of the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office for running costs stands 
at approximately £1.5 billion, or 0.3 per cent of 
government expenditure. Its complement of UK-origin 
diplomatic staff overseas has dropped to around 
1500, compared with close to 3000 in 1976. Once 
we are through the emergency measures to deal 
with the current debt crisis, this lack of front-line 
investment will have to be readdressed.
Where does this leave the UK in the global pack? 
Because we are no longer strong enough for 
independent action abroad, even to defend more 
than the smallest of our overseas possessions, 
we are defined by the company we keep and the 
allies we can bring to our cause. Whatever the UK 
electorate thinks, before anything else we belong 
in and to Europe. This can be true even if the 
relationship with the United States remains our single 
greatest asset, embracing a huge field of two-way 
commercial investment as well as a supremely useful 
security partnership. 
The fact is that our minor-part place in the American 
strategic firmament no longer delivers the same value 
as in the past, for two overwhelming reasons. First, 
as the world gradually returns, under the pressure of 
multipolar activity, to a collection of nation states with 
a low capacity for compromise in the global interest, 
the nationalistic inclinations of the US, which always 
lay at the heart of the formation of the Republic, are 
reasserting themselves in international affairs. The 
differences in perspective and societal characteristics 
between the two sides of the Atlantic will grow over 
the coming period. Second, the US’s capability for 
strategic positioning in the complex and competitive 
world of the 21st century will be constrained by 
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the anachronisms of the American constitution. As 
freedom of the individual advances, one of America’s 
great gifts to the world, so the checks and balances of 
the arrangements that protect that freedom, vested 
most visibly in Congress but also in the power of 
public opinion, grow in comparison to the authority 
and dynamism of executive government. There is not 
enough power in the hands of the President, the man 
generally assumed to be the most powerful in the 
world, to assess realistically and deliver effectively 
the US’s strategic interests in the multipolar era. This 
leaves the UK as a smaller part of a relatively smaller 
American firmament, if that is where we choose to 
place ourselves.
In strategic terms, Europe currently looks no more 
attractive. As in the US, the individual European citizen 
has become more independent from government. 
Local trumps supranational in people’s sense of 
identity, culture and political choice. Even while the 
UK is maligned in European circles for failing to 
capture the excitement of the European project, the 
trend amongst the peoples of the EU’s 27 states, 
big or (in particular) small, is towards preserving 
the national prerogative, as the UK has done from 
the beginning. Increasingly, the decisions taken 
on the most important issues within the EU are 
aligned to protecting the familiar way of life in each 
national space rather than to enlarging the power 
and global weight of the 27 as a collective. Helped 
by the polarising aspects of globalisation, the smalls 
are winning.
That does not mean that the UK is not part of the 
European journey. In the international environment 
of the millennium’s second decade, the region is the 
first port of call for any nation as it looks outward. 
The EU is the greatest experiment in collective action 
at the regional level in human history and other 
continents would love to be able to catch up. As an 
institution for preserving peace and democracy, for 
promoting economic and commercial interest, for 
raising standards in numerous areas of our existence 
as Europeans, the EU has done wonders. But it is 
running out of momentum for the same reasons as 
the United States: local preference and institutional 
inadaptability. No longer close enough in time to 
the driving force of its early days, which was the 
determination to escape from the memory of war, 
the EU has started to drift without understanding 
why. All institutions that depend on circumstance for 
their vitality do that, because global change moves 
faster than institutions can adjust.
This leaves the UK in an interesting position. Having 
failed to run with the leading pack in the days of 
Europe’s hunt for collective strength, we are now 
watching, a bit bemused, as the pack is hauled back 
to the normal condition of human affairs, tribalism. 
The politicians who had counted on progress along 
a straight upward line are finding it hard to readjust 
to this reverse tug on the pendulum. There is, of 
course, a huge amount still to play for, because the 
world’s evolution does not follow neat geometric 
concepts. But Europe’s current leaders, whose power 
still depends on their domestic constituencies, are 
showing low awareness of the forces limiting their 
international choices, or of the direction they need 
to take to give Europe a new purpose in the modern 
wider world.
Is there a role for the UK in such a picture? Not as 
a natural leader within Europe, probably, because 
we lack catalytic power and we have lost respect. 
We have not in recent years travelled the same path 
or acquired the same identity characteristics as the 
continental Europeans. But, provided we show we are 
willing partners, we have those assets of pragmatism, 
competence and vigour which managed to get things 
done in previous eras. The British are better team 
players than most; and we can help to construct 
the EU’s collective approach to the part-threat, part-
opportunity rise of the new economies such as China, 
India and Brazil, all of whom are showing some 
disdain for the European nations individually.
There is another facet of the UK’s make-up which 
gives us a fair wind in an egalitarian, complex and 
multipolar world: our cosmopolitan character. The 
legacy of Britain’s imperial past, which by today’s 
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standards had its shameful aspects, is the mix of 
ethnic backgrounds and political relationships we 
have carried into the 21st century. Moreover, contrary 
to what we often think about ourselves, we are a 
surprisingly tolerant nation. There will always be a 
nervousness at the margins about immigration and 
foreign-inspired extremism, but the enormous variety 
of inputs into our national life makes the nation as a 
whole extraordinarily adaptable to the social, cultural 
and therefore political eccentricities of a globalised 
planet. We are renewing ourselves at a pace and 
in a manner which may feel uncomfortable to the 
generally conservative instincts of British society, but 
which gives us a head-start over many other countries 
when it comes to fitting in to the new world as it is.
In short, the UK should not be too downbeat about 
itself. Its relative power has shrunk, but not to a 
point of insignificance. The global environment has 
altered to its disadvantage, but that is causing plenty 
of other nations – including the newly emerging ones 
- a comparable scale of problems. Our place in the 
hierarchy of the next decade will drop, but perhaps 
to a more comfortable and sustainable level for the 
majority of British citizens who do not want the 
country to be parading too forcefully on the global 
stage. And we have qualities of resourcefulness and 
adaptability which will show their strengths if we are 
accurate in judging the tempestuous flow of world 
events. But there is no getting away from the cardinal 
point: a huge amount depends on the strength of 
our economy. ■
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